Deck

Kaspi.kz · KSPI · NASDAQ

Kaspi.kz is a Kazakh fintech super-app — a single mobile front-end stitching together card and QR payments, a 3P marketplace, and a deposit-funded consumer-credit bank, used by roughly 83% of Kazakhstan's adult population.

$92.85
Price (26-May-26)
$17.8B
Market cap
₸4.05T
Revenue FY2025
15.7M
Monthly active users ~83% of KZ adults
LSE GDR since Oct-2020 at ~$6.5B valuation; NASDAQ ADR IPO Jan-2024 at $96 (~$17.5B); peaked $139 in Jul-2024 before a Sep-2024 short-seller report cut it 16% in a session; round-tripped to $69 in Mar-2026 on a Türkiye acquisition; back to $93 today.
2 · The dislocation

Halyk Bank multiple. MercadoLibre returns. One of those is wrong.

  • Priced like a country bank. KSPI trades at 7.8× trailing P/E on 58% Kazakhstan-only ROE. Nu Holdings trades 21.5× on 30% ROE; MercadoLibre 43.5× on 36%. Kaspi is best-in-peer on margin, ROE and leverage at the same time.
  • One customer, three engines. Payments, Marketplace and Fintech each generated ₸355–433B of FY2025 net income — three roughly-equal profit pools sharing one 15.7M-MAU base. CAC paid once, monetised three times: take-rate on ₸44.2T of payment volume, 10.5% commission plus ads on ₸6.7T of GMV, and NIM on an ₸11.7T loan book funded ~93% by retail tenge deposits.
  • Why the gap exists. Kazakhstan country tag, a January-2025 Türkiye acquisition that flat-lined consolidated net income, and an unrebutted 2024 short-seller file. Each is a real reason to discount — none is a structural reason to discount this much.
Closing even half the gap to Nu implies a double from spot. The trade is whether the discount is dislocation or regime.
3 · The forensic load-bearing concern

The model whose controls already failed once is the one being tested.

  • Coverage collapse. Allowance against gross non-performing loans fell from 99% (FY2023) → 90% (FY2024) → 80% (FY2025). Gross NPLs grew +91% over the window; the allowance grew only 53%. Rebuilding coverage to 90% takes ~₸89B of additional provisions — roughly 8% of FY2025 net income.
  • The Cost-of-Risk number says the opposite. Management reports Cost of Risk at 2.2% (FY2025) and 0.7% (Q1 2026). Coverage falling and CoR flat cannot both be the truth. The 1H 2026 IFRS interim, due Aug–Sep, prints the answer.
  • And the auditor hasn't blessed it yet. The FY2023 internal-control material weakness sat in this exact expected-credit-loss model. Management certified ICFR effective for FY2025 — but the first independent Section 404(b) auditor attestation only lands with the March-2027 20-F. Until then, the data-flywheel claim rests on a model whose controls have failed once in production.
If the bear is right, the data-flywheel narrative — 99.9% of loans approved in under six seconds at 2.2% CoR — collapses with it.
4 · The pivot

A Kazakh compounder became a two-country bet in fifteen months.

Before (2018–2024). From FY2019 to FY2024, revenue compounded at ~38% and operating margin held a 75–79% band — a profile only a handful of listed businesses match. The story was clean: one country, one super-app, one customer monetised three times, with excess cash returned as dividend.

Pivot (Oct-2024 → Apr-2026). Kaspi signed in October 2024 to buy 65.4% of Hepsiburada in Türkiye for ~$1.13B, closed January 2025, and absorbed ₸429.7B of goodwill plus a ₸89.6B Türkiye segment loss. FY2025 dividend zeroed, FY2026 guidance switched from net income to Adjusted EBITDA, Rabobank A.Ş. licence purchase pending. Tencent took a strategic minority in April 2026; two IG bonds raised at Baa3/BBB−, the second oversubscribed 3.5×.

Today. FY2025 consolidated revenue +60%, net income +3%. Kazakhstan-only underlying net income still grew ~18% — the headline flatness is funding-cost squeeze plus Türkiye drag, not a broken franchise. The unanswered question: does Hepsiburada earn back ₸430B of goodwill, or is Türkiye a five-year ad-hoc impairment risk?

Buying KSPI today is paying a one-country bank multiple for a three-engine consumer franchise — with a single hyperinflationary EM option attached.
5 · The dated events that settle this

The thesis is not binary on any single print — but three dated events do most of the work.

  • Aug–Sep 2026 — 1H 2026 IFRS interim. First disclosure that prints NPL coverage trajectory inside the 2026 cycle. Coverage rebuilding above 85% with CoR ≤ 2.5% confirms the data-flywheel; staying at/below 80% with CoR drifting above 2.5% confirms the bear.
  • 2H 2026 — first NBK base-rate cut window. Governor Suleimenov said cuts only possible "in the second half of this year." Each 100 bps cut reprices retail deposits faster than the 9.3-month loan book — mechanical Fintech NIM expansion the FY2026 +5% Adjusted EBITDA guide does not assume.
  • March 2027 — first Section 404(b) auditor attestation. Independent verdict on whether the FY2023 ECL-model material weakness is truly remediated. A clean opinion closes the load-bearing forensic concern and likely starts the Halyk-to-Nu re-rate; a qualified opinion re-opens the entire under-reserving file.
  • And the Hepsiburada test runs alongside. Management has committed to FY2026 Türkiye Adjusted EBITDA breakeven. Order growth went −11% (Q1-25) → +19% (Q4-25); engagement per consumer is still ~one-quarter of Kazakhstan. Any 2026 quarter back into Adj-EBITDA losses puts ₸430B of goodwill on the impairment clock.
6 · Bull & Bear

Lean long — the asymmetry is real, but size to survive the credit print.

  • For. 58% Kazakhstan-only ROE on a 93% retail-tenge deposit-funded book — a structurally rare EM asset trading at 7.8× while comparable EM fintechs carry 20–40× on lower returns.
  • For. Three independent post-Culper credibility events on the tape: US class action dismissed in C.D. California (May-2025); $600M IG bond placed at Baa3/BBB− with 3.5× oversubscription (Apr-2026); Tencent strategic stake taken alongside CEO Lomtadze (Apr-2026).
  • Against. NPL coverage 99 → 90 → 80% over three years while gross NPLs grew +91%. The FY2023 ICFR weakness was in this exact model. Roughly ₸89B of catch-up provisions — ~8% of net income — sits at the door if the bear reading is right.
  • Against. ₸429.7B of Hepsiburada goodwill (17% of equity) on a 1.4%-EBITDA-margin Turkish marketplace where engagement runs at one-quarter of Kazakhstan levels. Rabobank A.Ş. close has already slipped past 2H 2025 with no new date.
My view — franchise quality wins on weight of evidence, but the 1H 2026 NPL coverage print and the first Section 404(b) opinion are the dated tests. Underwrite the asymmetry; size to survive a confirmed credit print.

Watchlist to re-rate: 1H 2026 NPL coverage rebuild above 85% (or not); Hepsiburada Adjusted EBITDA staying positive each 2026 quarter; first NBK base-rate cut and the speed of deposit-cost reprice.